EricF

Tiiiime to take her home, her dizzy head is conscience laden.

Conversations kill.

And this chair... I don't need anything but ---

Nobody expects the Spanish Inquisition!

Y'all are lucky, this is first exam time of year round these parts.

On tbricks there was talk of an east coast Cannonball Run cross-country type thing... That might be awesome.

once again... flip cup is capable of owning your life. ever try full cup flip cup? it's the new craze. go do it.

Well Dana, to play your game (and I told myself I wouldn't patronize your question), my father's small company that I work for (full time part of the year):

Revenue skyrocketed a couple years ago (2001 or 2002?), and we didn't think it would be a sustained increase by any means, but it has steadily gone up since then.

We service and sell (where our revenue comes from, really) microscopy and microtomy equipment. There isn't a fundamental increase in the need for microscopes after 9/11 or anything, business has just been outstanding. My father founded the company in 1976 as well, so it's not like it's just getting onto its feet or anything.

Best it's ever been? For sure. Because of the president? Doubtful. But "he" (which to assume that the president himself dictates the state of the economy during his term is kinda silly) hasn't crippled us or as far as our personal involvement goes, the economy. That's what your post was asking for, so there you go.

I'd be down, as long as it's after I finish the 850...

Please!

Wow I feel like the biggest loser...

The economy was f*ed before 9/11, it contributed but it was still going to do what it was going to do.

It's not G.W.s fault, it's the all of the administrations from the past 24 years' faults.

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Another unbound variable

Figure in a steady decline in the state of the economy, the fact that it's typically very cyclical in nature, maybe find similar events to the WTC attacks that have happened in other highly developed countries, and probably a handful of other significant variables. Decide what sort of decline they would precipitate en lieu of Mr. Bush, and there is your control. Compare to the actual numbers, and see if it's better or worse.

It's imprecise, and physical scientists usually are quick to question its accuracy, but it's a strong stride away from normative meaningless research.

If you want feel-good random statistics that support your view, it's very easy to find them. It is difficult however, to find relatively sound research that supports your views (not any views in particular), and even more difficult to conduct your own research.

See, this is just normative bullshit, like everything else related to politics on messageboards

Isolate all other variables first, then give numbers. Though a meaningful empirical analysis of Bush's success as a president is pretty much impossible due to the World Trade Center attacks of September 11. Not much wasn't profoundly affected by that.

I'm not a nut-hugger of the president, but those numbers mean absolutely nothing. If you guys would like Political Research 101 one day, just ask me.

*something not retarded*

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Wow, I just realized what condition I was in when I wrote that...

Meaning, I don't really remember writing that

Booze is bad, mmkay? Gotta lay off of that stuff for a bit.

I'm gonna start hanging out with Chuck, and learn how to fight proper... Then I'll start my post-apocalyptic army.

See you guys when I take your oil for my non-running car.

This is for the couple of people interested in reading a *really* long paper I wrote. The actual analysis on the decision to deploy troops in Iraq starts about halfway down...

Analyzing current Foreign Policy Decision Making models and constructing an effective and applicable FPDM model.

Introduction: Commentary on currently established FPDM models.

In foreign policy decision making and the pursuit of accurate prediction and analysis, there have been some attempts at producing theories to successfully predict and explain various decisions made in the foreign policy arena. One person who has attempted to quantify the process into three different analytical models is Graham Allison. He suggests that there are three models that can be used in foreign policy decision making, the rational actor model, organizational process model, and the bureaucratic politics model. What follows immediately is a critique of these models, and Allison’s conclusions regarding this theory.

The rational actor model is the first model Allison outlines, and is the most general. It assumes that in order to make the decision, those who would be making it will consider all possible options, and weigh their benefits and drawbacks to the state. Once this is quantified, the most beneficial choice will become clear to policy-makers. The problem with using this model solely is that it makes various assumptions that often do not hold true in empirical analyses.

They most glaring assumption is that the actor in the model is assumed to be rational. The corollary to this is that those doing the analysis share their definition of rational with the actor they are analyzing.

Additionally, all acts of a state are assumed to be calculated and weighed out logically; there is no room for errors on the behalf of the state producing these actions. Also, the state is assumed to have enough time to successfully deliberate a decision and reach the most optimal conclusion; there is no room for decisions made with a pressing deadline.

Another assumption within this model is that all parties affecting the decision-making process hold common interests-- that is, the most optimal outcome is optimized for everyone.

The second “paradigm” Allison discusses is the organizational process model. This stance contends that organizations within a government produce the actions of that state as a result of their processes and standard operating procedures. It reasons that government officials have only a limited ability to influence or guide what would naturally occur as a result of these processes.

It seems very easy to prescribe this model as a solution to analyzing the actions of states, but assumes there is an infrastructure present in all governments that has such well-established protocol. It would seem that this model is biased heavily towards Western states with the organizational depth and division of labor essential to this model.

The bureaucratic politics model, as outlined by Allison, suggests that the decisions made regarding foreign policy is a reflection of the constant conflicts and trade-offs being made between organizations within the government with conflicting interests. Instead of one rational actor, there is a collection of relatively rational actors present within a state, whose contending views on the situation at hand lead them to different opinions, who each contribute “pieces“ to the action taken.

The criticisms of this model an under-emphasis mainly of those factors around which the rational actor model centers. Within this model, it is suggested that often times the consequences of the faction or organization who these actors represent within the state may yield a more or less severe consequence of a given decision than the state as a whole will, and as such, the actors will contribute their part of the decision hinging on special interests and fears of themselves or who they represent.

A problem with this construct is that the model loses practicality when it lends credence to too many small factors below any sort of meaningful analysis, and a milieu of possible relevant variables, almost precluding the isolation of all meaningful variables. Further criticism of this as a set rule will become more clear as the paper progresses.

Combining these theories to create an effective model of analysis.

Various facets of these ideas can be melted together to create a more solid final method of analysis in FPDM.

Analyzing the factors present:

What follows is a groundwork for effectively analyzing any foreign policy situation. Various potentially ambiguous terms will be denoted as they appear, and what immediately follows is a summary of some key assumptions that will be made.

It is assumed that there is a possibility of contending interests present in every situation. In few situations, decisions are made entirely by one person’s original views. Therefore there are multiple parties involved in most decisions, and it is possible that, and definable to what extent, their respective interests differ. It is also assumed that the number of parties involved in making a given decision can be pinpointed, and their respective interests are of varying overall importance. These interests also change from situation to situation. The extent to which the interests are represented is largely a matter of the power held by those who hold those interests.

It is assumed that though mutual interests are held between two or more parties, perceived threats to these interests may exist. Though a major component of bounded rationality, this is vital to the understanding of this construct and defining its limits and applications.

It is also assumed that actors within this model have varying ability and tendency to weigh interests and act on them relatively rationally. Those involved in making a decision will first weigh their various interests, and create an agenda for which they will contend to differing degrees on behalf of each interest they hold. It is also assumed that these interests can be observed and the actors’ weighing of them can be predicted and/or observed based on their current and prior actions.

The interests of actors are typically reflections of their inherent needs as human beings, or groups of human beings. If a person holds the well-being of an organization which they belong to, and this is a clear interest of theirs, it can be derived that they hold this interest through analysis of their need for “love” as depicted in Maslow’s hierarchy of needs.

There is some degree of repeatability in similar recurring situations that can be observed, including insofar as to pinpoint unique tendencies of individuals. This is a key assumption in that it may help to provide an explanation for puzzling actions on behalf of the actor(s) in question, and providing a means by which future “inexplicable” actions may be predicted correctly. It is also assumed that patterns in these actions exist and are readily observable.

It is also acknowledged that there can be time limitations involved in virtually every foreign policy decision. It is fairly obvious that decisions are generally made to a deadline or in a circumstance that favors immediate or timely decisions to be made. As such, weighing and processing of options and their effects on the various interests at stake can be compromised due to hasty generalizations and general oversight as a result.

How to quantify these factors:

There is a hierarchy of interests present in all individuals, which are similar towards the top and depart from each other as lower level interests are considered. Though there is a frequency of conflicting interests from party to party, virtually all individuals share common interests on a high enough level. At these high levels, the premise of the rational actor model can be successfully implemented. For instance, the decision to defend yourself against another state who is clearly aggressive. Self preservation and preservation of the state are two of these commonly shared interests, and are most clearly presented in situations in which an imminent threat is mutually acknowledged by all parties. When Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, there was little debate as to whether retaliatory action was in order.

However, when the situation is not so clearly depicted, interests may remain the same, but the perceived threat to these interests may differ greatly. In much the same way as when a teenager’s parents keep him/her from doing something that may harm them (though the teenager does not think it a possibility), it is possible that some parties involved in the decision making process may have a greater or more limited insight into the possible ramifications of certain options. Essentially, the degree to which actors can act rationally is sometimes limited by the facts which they possess.

Alternatively, rationality of actors is also limited by the inherent cognitive limitations of the human mind, that is, the human mind is often unable to see true rationality. This was initially suggested by Herbert Simon, in his concept put forth of “bounded rationality,” in which rationality is bounded by the cognitive abilities of the human mind.

Understanding Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs and how to apply its concepts to FPDM:

This proposition of a hierarchy of interests can be incorporated into Abraham Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs. Maslow proposed that human beings possess a hierarchy of needs which their actions aim to satisfy. The heart of this model is that human beings cannot focus on the next level until the previous level has been secured. It is a bottom-up construction, with the bottom and most important level being that of physiological needs. For the purposes of FPDM, this level will probably not come into play. However, the next level is safety. This would indicate a realist bias, though it is possible that this bias may be removed by indicating instead that this level be referred to as “perceived” safety. Possible interests of actors that would parallel this need for security, of course, would be the preservation of self and state, etc.

The next level on the hierarchy is the need for love. Love encompasses the need for belonging, love (non-sexual) from others and such, to and from those closest to us, and those with the most important bearing on our lives. Parallel interests of actors in FPDM situations could include a tendency towards group think, partisan politics in general, and a desire to represent the interests of those close to you.

Next on Maslow’s hierarchy is the category of esteem needs. There are two types in this category. There is the self-satisfaction (self-esteem) that comes from mastery of a task or competence, and there is the recognition by others of this, and perception of competency and power in others. Possible applications in an FPDM situation could include but not be limited to situations in which actors go out of their way to bolster their perceived power, or when actors do things that may reassure themselves of their power and competency.

The final category of needs that Maslow proposes is that of self-actualization. These needs reflect a “desire to become more and more what one is, to be everything that one is capable of being.” This is generally applicable in situations wherein one becomes introspective and no longer requires further outside reinforcement and focuses solely on their own betterment and such, and so forth. The applications in FPDM appear somewhat limited, though this may help provide rationalization for isolationism and other little-examined phenomena.

Using Maslow’s hierarchy as a basis for the hierarchy of interests may provide a very useful foundation for a more applicable hierarchy in FPDM. Each actor’s interests can be realized by using Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. For the purposes of this analysis, the physiological needs will be overlooked.

The need for security can be translated most precisely and applicably into “The tendency to act in a way to ensure feelings that one’s well-being is not in jeopardy,” this will be used as the basic interest that all actors need to preserve before consideration for other interests is pursued. The implications of this are that the actor may not actually have to be totally safe, only that they must feel safe enough to focus on other things besides preserving their own well-being. This will prove frustrating to definitively analyze, however key it may be.

The need for love can be expressed as “The tendency for actors to behave such as they create or reinforce perceptions of importance or belonging in others’, especially those close to them.” This tendency is very group-oriented. Whether the group be family or an organization, it essentially comes down to the actor in question trying to create and enhance relationships and closeness to those around them.

The esteem-centered needs can be translated as “The tendency to act in a way that pleases oneself and others.” This can possibly be reduced to the pleasing of oneself, with pleasing of others merely a contributing factor in self-esteem, though there may be some inherent desire in human beings to want to please others, insofar as for this pleasure to extend beyond that of augmenting one’s own self esteem.

The need to “self-actualize” roughly can be depicted as “The tendency to act to fulfill a higher purpose,” wherein the actor does not need to “prove” anything, they do not need to cater to their own more simplistic needs for approval, acceptance and affection, nor do they need to attempt to manipulate how others perceive them. This is a higher form of self-satisfaction; the feeling of ultimate fulfillment. Whatever an actor perceives this ultimate fulfillment to be can vary greatly, it generally involves serious introspection but may entail manifest destiny or similar imperialistic ideals.

Perhaps the most critical aspect of this construct is acknowledging that the various tendencies to preserve different interests is a hierarchy; there is a progression of higher to lower concern present.

Another critical aspect of understanding this model fully is that the needs outlined by Maslow need only be satisfied in the perceptions of the actor in which they are operating. In the same way, the interests of these actors need only be preserved and represented to a degree that satisfies the actor. This will likely prove to be a confounding variable at times, though it is imperative for an accurate construct.

How to derive the level of importance of a given interest:

When an interest is isolated (for instance: a leader’s desire to stay in office), it can be analyzed and grouped as a reflection of one of the levels on Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. For the example of a leader’s desire to stay in office, more would need to be known about that leader’s country. If losing the position of leader would precipitate ex-communication or death, then the interest of maintaining the position would fall onto the top-most level, as a failure to preserve that interest would threaten the security of that individual.

By contrast, if losing the position would mean fading out of the lime light and living a comfortable life in safety, this interest would likely fall in the esteem-centered level, and thus not be as central a concern for this leader when making decisions in this circumstance.

Military action with Iraq again: A brief FPDM analysis.

Isolating those making the decision:

The first step in analyzing this situation is identifying the parties who will be involved in making the decision. This would be the president and Congress in this instance. The focus here must remain on who has the technical authority to make the decisions.

Isolating the various relevant interests of those making the decision:

The president:

George W. Bush is the president in this situation. He has the authority to deploy troops. He has a number of direct interests that will be significantly affected by the decision to go to war with Iraq, and vice-versa.

1. Being the son of George H. W. Bush, he is interested in his father’s contentedness and respects his opinion.

2. With Dick Cheney as his vice president and arguably his closest advisor, he will be interested in taking into account Cheney’s opinion and feelings regarding the decision. The same can be said regarding his other advisors.

3. Constantly being under the lime light as well as being a first-term president, Bush is very interested in the public’s opinion. If the public likes or dislikes his decision, it will affect his chances of being re-elected, as well as affect the smoothness of the remainder of his term. His actions are reviewed by the public through selected information and accompanying commentary of the press, so the press and their opinions must also be taken into consideration.

4. In the presidency as a representative as the Republican party, he feels obligated to generally represent the party’s feelings and uphold their stance on the issue at hand. Continuing receipt of strong Republican party support is imperative to his continued success as a politician.

5. The interest of the well-being of the United States and in turn himself.

6. The interest of maximizing efficiency of American foreign involvement.

7. The interest of gaining approval from the international community. This will aid in further economic and other negotiations, as well as improving America’s image throughout the world.

8. The interest of the Iraqi people.

Congress:

It is acknowledged that the two chambers of Congress both need to approve of the President’s decision to deploy and use troops, with reviews of the situation every 60 days. In this way, the President’s decision to deploy troops does not mean much without Congressional support. It must also be acknowledged that the Congress is a large collection of individuals, and they will need to be addressed as such (though they may be broken into groups at times), as individual analysis would be too tedious in all practical senses.

1. Party loyalty. This issue is of paramount importance to Congressmen.

2. Public opinion. Like for the president, the public’s opinion is a huge factor in re-election chances.

3. Opinion of their financial backers. Since re-election is largely dependent on campaigning, funding to do so is paramount in importance.

4. The interest of the United States and the Congress members themselves.

Isolating the consequences on various interests of possible decisions:

In this analysis we will limit the possible choices considered to military invasion and lack of military action. There are intermediate possibilities, but for the purpose of this analysis they will not be addressed.

The President:

1. In the event of military invasion of Iraq and removal of Saddam Hussein, his father will most likely be pleased. This is not however that important based on the hierarchy we are using. It falls into the second tier of needs, the need for love and acceptance of those closest to us. This is not even overly significant on this level due to the fact that choosing not to intervene in Iraq militarily to remove Saddam’s regime would not necessarily jeopardize his fulfillment of this need.

2. The issue of Dick Cheney and his other advisors brings up a complicated mixture of interests. With the exception of Colin Powell, most of the President’s cabinet were in favor of immediate military action in Iraq. To assess fully the effect that the decision would have, it is necessary to consider what his cabinet’s contributions to his presidency are. I would suggest that President Bush has a fairly reasonable sense of competency, in that he relies on advisors relatively heavily, acknowledging that his own competency is limited. In this respect, this reliance naturally creates some desire to please them. A prime topic of debate is the Cheney-Bush alleged connections with various defense contractors and corporations. Assuming that some of these ties exist, Bush’s desire to please Cheney will be greater than that of his other advisors, being that Cheney will be more insistent on military action. Assuming Bush shares some of the same ties, this is another interest of his.

If the decision is made not to initiate a military operation in Iraq, then his advisors will likely be unhappy with him, which may have various effects, including a compounding negative influence on his interest in his party’s support. He could stand to lose the support of the big businesses that provide his campaign with many resources. The former effect would fall into the level of esteem needs as well. He wants to maintain a good relationship with his cabinet members, who have varying degrees of closeness to him. Perhaps more assured is the fact that it will play a major role in his ability to fulfill his esteem-centered needs, though being close members of an organization to which they belong, there is some effect on the security of his love-based needs as well. The latter effect of dissatisfaction of certain corporations would chiefly lie in his esteem-based needs.

3. Perhaps the most easily analyzed interest of the President’s is that of public opinion. Being as the public is nearly directly responsible for his re-election into office, it would be unwise to disregard the public’s opinion. Though, it is ranked in the esteem needs in this analysis, as the president will not have the security of his well-being called into question if the public becomes angry and does not re-elect him. In this case however, the public was decidedly supportive of action in Iraq, so only a decision not to deploy troops in Iraq would create a majority disapproval. And even then it would not be terribly disapproving, as support does not necessarily equate to more than approval for such actions.

4. It is the interest of the Republican Party that may affect multiple levels of his hierarchy of needs. Choosing the same option as is supported by his party, which in this case would be war, would help to reinforce his esteem level of needs. And in his case, would affect his love-based needs as well, being as his brother and father are both Republican party members of some standing, though his father did not openly support the decision to go to war (nor did he openly speak up against it, though).

5. This is arguably the most important aspect through this analysis. The interest of the security of the United States and in turn his own security.

For this issue, we will assume that his stated concern regarding Saddam Hussein’s remaining in power as a threat to the United States, either directly or through funding various terrorist organizations, is genuine. If this is the case, then he feels that removing Saddam Hussein from power will help to eliminate potential threats to his own well-being, as well as that of those around him, which could arguable fall into all levels. The real operative variable here is how threatened he feels his well-being is. We are going to assume that it is only to a relatively mild degree which he feels this threat. He is not placed in a direct confrontation, nor does he have overwhelming evidence that the threat is there.

At this point it seems clear that the President will act according to the base tendency outlined above, and act to enhance his feeling of a secure well-being. However, the consequences that military aggression may have on the potential well-being of the US should also be considered. If removing Saddam from power only triggers more terrorist activity or further destabilizes the region, it could negatively impact the President’s perceived security of well-being of his state and himself. It appears to be an ambiguous lose-lose situation as far as what should theoretically be the most important factor is concerned. Assuming that this is how the President perceived the situation, this is a relatively neutral factor. However, attacking Iraq may help to improve the security of his esteem-based needs. Whereas inaction may harm them.

It is almost uncontested that if Saddam ceases to control Iraq the new government will trade oil more favorably with the US. This would stand to augment Bush’s esteem-based needs even further.

6. The interest of maximizing the efficiency of American foreign involvement is a fairly specialized interest in this case. At the time the decision was to be made, American troops were being freed up in Afghanistan, and if action was to be taken in Iraq, doing so efficiently would involve movement from troops to Afghanistan to Iraq, rather than the withdrawal and re-deployment of a large army to the same region. This would obviously require a very quick decision if it were to be conducted in this manner. And the appeal of not having to re-deploy this army would suggest quick military aggression in Iraq. Yielding to this interest would fuel esteem-based needs of the president. Failure to do so would likely also be a strike against general support for the war in America.

7. The interest of gaining approval of the international community was that the United States pursue more diplomatic and non-violent channels before it used a military attack on Iraq. Winning the approval and support of international pressure could ease the war process, though due to the current convenience of American troops that would undoubtedly need to be called back awhile to wait, this would not seem to be such a clear aid. Essentially then the approval of the international community would simply make Bush feel more comfortable and pleased with his decision, which would again help his esteem-based needs.

8. Another consideration is the interest of the Iraqi people. The fact that acting on or against their behalf would largely fall on the top-most self-actualization level of the hierarchy suggests that this was likely not the most urgent consideration for the President, one way or the other.

A Brief overview of Congress’ interests at hand, noting only where they differ from the President.

The main factor here that would differ from the President’s priorities is the increased concern with their financial campaign backers. It is this group of people who makes their repeated tenures as Congressmen possible, providing funds with which to operate their respective campaigns. This however is not so different from the President’s groups of interests in that they are generally supporters of the party and its stances. So this would typically be an extension of party loyalty. Which in this case has proven to be clear support for military action by the Republicans, and a mixed response from the Democrats, though the party itself is in support of the decision to go to war.

A conclusion regarding the decision to deploy troops to Iraq in an expedient fashion:

The President, as can be traced above, has an overwhelming motivation to call to deploy troops immediately in Iraq.

He did this based partially on his tendency to belong and be accepted (ala his brother and cabinet members). However this small amount of need for increased acceptance is not the driving force behind the decision to go to war with Iraq. Rather, the chief reason would be the broader and less personal tendency to act in a way that will please others and himself. In this case it has proven very easy to weigh the options against each other, as there were only a few interests that would be compromised with the more acceptable decision.

The Congress, similar to the President, followed his lead and likely drew many of the same conclusions, as they were burdened with many of the same interests. As with the President, their tendency to want to act in a way that will please others and themselves led them to satisfy the majority of their interests by approving of the President’s decision to go into Iraq.

If this model were used on a dictatorial or less stable state, there would be far more levels of the hierarchy being tweaked.

For Example, North Korea’s decision to invade South Korea:

We will assume that Kim Jong-il is the sole actor responsible for deciding whether or not to invade South Korea.

Brief summary of his interests would likely appear as follows:

1. Interest in expanding his state to include South Korea.

It is obvious which decision would achieve this. It can be perceived as a manifest destiny of sorts, fulfilling what his empire should encompass. This would be listed under the self-actualization level, as it is striving to achieve greater fulfillment and attempting to realize full potential.

2. Interest to stay in office after this event.

In this case, it is likely that global intervention, led by the UN and US would come stop the invasion directly. The repercussions of this would likely be either death or international trial. As such, it is a direct threat to Kim’s well-being, and is a significant one at that.

3. Interest in public support.

He really doesn’t care too much about public support, he molds it to what he feels it should be. This could possibly be a small influence to his esteem-based needs, however it is unlikely that it could amount to anything that could influence how he acts.

Conclusions drawn from comparing the two cases:

So with a less stable state and different form of government, we see that the actors who make the decisions can vary significantly. In addition, various interests held by these powers that be may remain the same, the actions affecting these interests may be very different, as the hierarchical level to which each interest matters can be totally different.

Comments on and criticisms of the previously outlined FPDM:

This is admittedly a very in-depth model that could probably benefit from some tweaking in several areas. However, it provides a very thorough, algorithmic basis from which to work.

If sufficient data is available to produce an accurate representation of the most important conflicting interests held by those making the decision, a very accurate analysis can be formed. However, if key pieces of information are left out of the analysis, this could skew the results of the model significantly.

One flaw inherent to this model is the vague nature of weighing the decisions’ impacts on various interests. It should not be overly problematic to place the consequences on the hierarchy, however once they are placed, the degree to which similarly placed consequences are weighed against one another may also be problematic. Both of these problems precipitate a need for deeper analysis, or a mastery of the knowledge of the case at hand. In any case, it is a very complex model, and can be expanded upon, though some form of simplification would stand to benefit its usefulness.

I wrote a 20 page paper on a new Foreign Policy Decision Making model (FPDM Model), and used the Iraq war as my example of its application.

It was written almost a year ago, but if anyone would like me to post it here, just let me know. It's 20 pages though, so I won't post it unsolicited.

I didn't research the topic as deeply as I could have, but reading the paper would pretty quickly allow dismissal of posts like "he told us it was for this reason so that's it" or "we went for oil, isn't it obvious?"

Not to neglect those opinions, but often times I see you guys clamoring for an "intelligent discussion"...

*something not retarded*

Almost killed my friends tonight... They did a good job of humiliating themselves so I wouldn't kick them out of my house. Long story :P

Well, of all the Florida Volvo people we've got, how many are here?

Not enough.

It's cool though, this meet's been pretty awesome... Just y'all need to stop bein' bitches and come on.

ohhh, you got served!

that means it's on!

No your not.

Man, you "drunk" posters are boring as stuff

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show us how it's done?

or have theresa do it...

ohhh, i am still drunk, yet i feel hung over?

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Me too. Or the other way around?

holy crap..... happy new year's, everyone. irish car bombs equals death among men.

one day my car will be fast. i swear.

btw:

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"Hercules in New York" is possibly the best movie of all time..........

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there you have it!

Word to Pat, this post- car bombs glass of wine goes out to you, along with most of the other ones.... happy new year's guys.

monkey YOU, UPPER RESPERATORY INFECTION. Everybody must drink one (or several) for me tonight. I command it.

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Done and done...

Spaten makes some good stuff for sure.

The beast is drinkable, but only in drastic times... Busch long necks are surprisingly good, I challenge anyone brave enough to pick up a 12-pack. It's no worse than any other American beers, anyway.

While we're on the topic of cheap beers, Old Milwaukee Light is very good for the cost and for a light beer. That's another challenge I'll extend to y'all.

In addition, since I'm making a sober post in the thread, I'll apologize in advance for any posts I might make Friday night, should I stumble onto the computer. Irish car bombs... That should say enough about the direction of the evening ;)

For this subject, I like the Germans' ideas.

Drinking at 14, driving at 18.... Driving is a much greater responsibility than drinking. I think most people would agree that the glamour of drinking excessively usually fades after the first year or two after you've started drinking. I would much rather not be able to drive during that learning curve than otherwise.

Case in point, I started driving when I was 15-16, and started drinking when I was 17-18. I got a DUI when I was 19 that was totally my fault. I think it could have been different though if I'd have had more exposure to alcohol beforehand and made to appreciate driving more than I did at the time.

So yeah, go Germany! Michael Schumacher for king of the world!

Okay, so we went in to "liberate" them. Fine. They've been liberated, but oh! wait! now they want to kill us. So... why are we sticking around? Seems like a waste of taxpayer money, and more importantly, our soldier's lives. The Iraqi's don't want us, so forget those .

I'm just tired of reading about all these suicide attacks, and everything else. We pissed them off, they want us out, so why do we insist on staying? It's just a waste of lives to try and do so. Pull out, and leave them to their own devices -- they'll probably blame us for where they end up, but monkey it, they're going to blame us anyways.

I know we're not really there because we give a crap about the Iraqis, but because we want their oil. Fine, secure the oil infrastructure, and leave the rest of the country to it's own devices. It's hard to go after a dug-in enemy, especially if it's a guerilla enemy in a heavily civilain area. So let's dig in outselves, but in an open area. They wanna monkey with us still? Fine, but they can't claim they were innocent bystanders when they come to our front door looking for trouble.

monkey this stuff, man... geez.

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OK, want to hear a "bigger-picture" type of analysis of this? Not to disregard what you're saying...

But this is about the most cut-and-clear case of "war-weariness" I've read first-hand about the Iraq war. And I bet that increasing war-weariness makes us pull out of Iraq eventually, too.

Why will war-weariness continue to increase? Because we're Americans. We grow impatient if it takes more than a minute for the guy at the drive-through to get us our food. Our society is based on instant gratification, blablabla, there are a million essays and short stories about that.

So we went to Iraq for a number of reasons, none of which were strong enough to give the American people enough resolve to get beyond "OK, it's been a year, it's not over, what's the problem?" And now there's a backlash of people who think that it's taking too long and it's beyond their comfort zone of waiting. I'm not criticizing, just trying to analyze a little (because this seems to be a growing sentiment among the people I talk to).

Anyway, just something to think about.